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LABOR AND MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN




A core principle in labor organization has been the notion
that unions are for workers and not for management—that in any
union organization, the interests of labor and the interests of man-
agement must be kept separate by excluding the latter from the
ranks of the former.1  While this principle was not expressed in the
body of the United States National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”
or “Act”), it did achieve expression more than a decade later in the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.  Here, the concept of supervision was for-
mally defined—and those deemed “supervisors” were then com-
prehensively deprived of the right to organize, a right given to all
other employees under Section 7 of the NLRA.
The definition of “supervisor” has been subject to different in-
terpretations over the last six decades.  The agency charged with
formulating these interpretations—the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”)—has displayed a lack of consistency in
regards to the supervisor exemption.  One factor has also been ab-
sent from the NLRB calculus: the changing nature of work itself.
Over the six decades in which the legislative, executive and
judicial branches have wrestled with what it means to be a “supervi-
sor,” the stratum upon which this definition is built has undergone
a dramatic shift.  Work in the twenty-first century is less about re-
petitive performance of an algorithm and much more about team-
work, creativity, and flexibility.  Just as the industrial era that gave
birth to the union movement has turned into an information age
in which organized labor seems irrelevant, so too has the self-di-
rected knowledge worker of the information age increasingly re-
placed the ubiquitous factory worker of the industrial era.
This Article’s analysis of the supervisory exemption concludes
with the uneasy realization that the nature of supervision has
* Department of Law, Yarmouk University, LL.B. 1999; James E. Rogers College of
Law, University of Arizona, LL.M. 2001; Washington College of Law, American Uni-
versity, S.J.D. 2005.
1 See Jared S. Gross, Recognition of Labor Unions in a Comparative Context, 78 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 357, 361–66 (2003).
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changed in a fundamental manner that was unforeseen by the cre-
ators of Taft-Hartley and that this change cannot be fully accom-
modated under the current laws.  If the protection given to
millions of American workers under the Act is to be continued
safely far into this new century, a legislative remedy may be re-
quired.  This legislation could serve to reconcile the differences be-
tween the changing nature of American work and the true intent
of the NLRA.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1935, the United States was in the depth of the Great De-
pression, and after five straight years of hard times, rents and rips
were beginning to show in the fabric of society.  The American
birth rate had declined for the first time in the history of the na-
tion.2  Popular resentment against the government and the rich
had reached an all-time high and had led the nation to “share the
wealth.”3  Unemployment had reached national levels as high as
twenty-five percent and, in some factory towns, could be found at
levels as high as seventy-five percent.4  It seems almost inconceiv-
able today, but it is important to remember that we are dealing
with a time period when it was possible to see gangs of unemployed
men fighting for scraps of discarded food outside restaurants.5
In that time-honored tradition of American politics, President
Roosevelt sought to co-opt the positions of his rivals and, through
assimilating them, tone them down enough to make them palat-
able to a wider spectrum of the citizenry.  In such a “share the
wealth” spirit, 1935 witnessed both the creation of the Social Secur-
ity Program and the Works Progress Administration.  To complete
this New Deal portfolio, President Roosevelt also signed into law
the National Labor Relations Act in July of that same year.6
The NLRA defined for the first time exactly what constituted
unfair labor practices.  It gave both employers and unions strict
2 FREDERICK ALLEN, SINCE YESTERDAY: THE 1930S IN AMERICA 107 (Harper & Row)
(1940) (cataloguing the falling birth rate and noting however, that marriage rates of
the time were rising, perhaps because divorce was simply too expensive).
3 Id. at 69–70.
4 PIERS BRENDON, THE DARK VALLEY: A PANORAMA OF THE 1930S 86 (Random
House 2002) (2000).
5 LOUISE ARMSTRONG, WE TOO ARE THE PEOPLE 10 (De Capo 1972) (1938)
(describing a scene in which a crowd of some fifty men were fighting over a barrel of
garbage that had been set outside the back door of a restaurant).
6 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 151 (1958).
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guidelines and rules for worker organization.7  The NLRA estab-
lished a new federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board,
to investigate claims of unfair labor practices and ensure fair union
elections.  Perhaps most importantly, section 7 of the NLRA gave
American workers the basic right to organize.8  The revolutionary
impact of the NLRA was that it provided a peaceful, orderly mecha-
nism by which labor could organize, a mechanism unlike the ear-
lier preferred tool of labor—the strike, which was chaotic and
costly.
The impact of the NLRA did not arrive immediately.  Other
classic Roosevelt constructions had been dismissed by the Supreme
Court as unconstitutional, including the National Recovery Admin-
istration.  Thus, both labor and management did not change their
tactics the day after the NLRA was signed into law—instead they
waited for the Court to have their say.9  This dramatic event took
place in 1937 as the Court heard NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel.10
Here, the argument revolved around whether intrastate economic
activity could be regulated by Congress under the Wagner Act.
The Supreme Court decided that even purely intrastate activity
might have serious implications on later interstate commerce and
thus could indeed be regulated by Congress.11  With this, the
NLRA assumed the full force of law.
A. The Early Years of the NLRA
In the first decade of its existence, the NLRA—if judged solely
upon the number of workers on the union rolls—can only be seen
as an unqualified success. Union membership, beginning at ap-
proximately three million members representing about twelve per-
cent of the workforce in 1935, had skyrocketed to almost twelve
million members representing a full one-third of the workforce by
7 See William C. Green, Negotiating the Future: The NLRA Paradigm and the Prospects
for Labor Law Reform, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 424 (1994).
8 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2004) (“Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.”).
9 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6.
10 See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This decision
came within weeks of Roosevelt’s “Court Packing” proposal and ran so counter to
earlier Supreme Court decisions that it has been referred to as “the switch in time that
saved nine.” See ALLEN, supra note 2, at 238–39.
11 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37.
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1945.12  Ironically, this dramatic growth in union membership had
been accomplished without any reference in the NLRA to the role
of supervisors.  It seemed to many as if the Section 7 right to organ-
ization could be extended to practically anyone in a corporation
below the level of director.13  This seemingly limitless granting of
Section 7 rights would come to haunt the NLRB in the late 1940s
in a case involving the Packard Motor Company.
Workers at Packard unionized shortly after the NLRA was con-
firmed constitutional in 1937.  The union had enrolled 32,000
members by the mid-1940s, but about 1200 employees who held
the rank of “foreman” were not part of the union at Packard.14
These foremen were obviously supervising rank-and-file work-
men and were treated more like management in that they were
compensated through salary as opposed to hourly pay, had access
to paid vacation and sick leave, and were also responsible for disci-
plining the workers in their units—although ultimate decisions on
firing or hiring were made by other departments.  Still, the NLRB
recognized their right to organize under Section 7, and Packard
refused to bargain.  The core dispute revolved around how exactly
to classify the foremen under the NLRA.  The NLRB argued that
the foremen were employees15 while Packard countered with the
argument that the foremen were actually employers.16  This dis-
pute over Section 7 rights reached the Supreme Court in early
1947.
The Supreme Court rejected Packard’s argument that the
foremen were more employers than employees.  In its opinion, the
Court pointed out that both arguments had relatively equal merit,
but it was not within the Court’s power to set policy, only to inter-
pret legislation.17  Justice Douglas, in a scathing dissent, pointed
out the basic flaw in the NLRA legislation—that without a firm def-
inition of “supervisor,” such parties as the Packard foremen could
be legitimately placed in either camp.18  He went on to point out
some basic absurdities with the NLRA as it currently stood, positing
12 U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/bls/
blsuniondata.htm (last visited on Nov. 18, 2008).
13 See Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing After Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB—A Time to Reex-
amine the Rule of Babcock & Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 75–76 (1994).
14 See Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485, 487 (1947).
15 Id. at 488.
16 Id.
17 These arguments are policy matters, therefore, the Court is not authorized to
base a decision of a question of law on them. “They concern the wisdom of the legisla-
tion; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions.” Id. at 494.
18 Id. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the notion that if foremen are to be seen as employees, so too must
every corporate employee up to the level of vice-president.19
Thus, after Packard, the basic right to organize would be seen
as a right belonging to every wage-earning employee, no matter
how closely his or her duties were aligned with company manage-
ment.  In that decision, the Court pointed out the logical contra-
dictions but also made clear that unless Congress were to amend
the NLRA to account for the problem of supervisors, there was no
action that the Court could take to remedy this flaw.  It would not
be long before Congress took action.
B. The Taft-Hartley Act and the Supervisor Exemption
Again, history must color the analysis.  By 1947, Democrats
had controlled the executive branch for fifteen years.  Labor un-
rest, held to a nearly non-existent minimum during the World War,
had increased exponentially in the years following the defeat of the
Axis, with almost five million American workers involved in strikes
during 1946 alone.20  The Republican Party had chafed under the
employee-based NLRA.  Formally known as the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, Taft-Hartley passed contentiously in June of
1947, over President Truman’s veto.21
Just like the NLRA, the Taft-Hartley Act defined a slate of “un-
fair labor practices.”  But if the NLRA used this term to define un-
fair management practices against labor, Taft-Hartley defined
unfair practices by labor against management. Where the NLRA
granted workers the right to organize, the Taft-Hartley Act gave
employers the right to oppose union organization.  Some Taft-
Hartley highlights include allowing states to pass right-to-work stat-
utes, requiring unions to give notice prior to striking, the prohibi-
tion of closed shops, and the outlawing of secondary boycotts.
Most importantly, the Taft-Hartley Act responded to the Su-
preme Court by amending the NLRA to include a specific defini-
tion of the term “supervisor” and excluding such supervisors from
the right to organize.  The definition, hereby referred to as 2(11),
is designed to be interpreted in the disjunctive and reads as
follows:
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
19 Id. at 498.
20 See BERT COCHRAN, LABOR AND COMMUNISM 254 (1977).
21 See FRED A. HARTLEY JR., OUR NEW NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 102 (1948).
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employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in con-
nection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not
of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.22
Needless to say, Taft-Hartley was not well received by the mem-
bers and leadership of organized labor.  Typical of the response
would be this quote from the National Maritime Union: “[T]he
Taft-Hartley Law [is] aimed at crippling and destroying not only
our Union but all trade unions.”23  However, union membership
continued to climb, albeit much more slowly than in those days
following first passage of the NLRA.  Union membership as a per-
centage of the total workforce would peak in 1960, with thirty-
seven percent of the workforce on the union rolls, amounting to
almost eighteen million American workers.
The repeal of Taft-Hartley became a campaign issue in the
1948 presidential race, but after the election, President Truman
chose not to pursue it, distracted as he was by the outbreak of hos-
tilities abroad.  With Taft-Hartley now the law of the land, the role
of the NLRB lay in exactly how to interpret it and to separate the
obvious supervisory exclusion now written into law from the more
implicit managerial exclusion that arose through interpretation.
In Denver Dry Goods, one of the first cases to come before it since
the passage of Taft-Hartley, the NLRB decided to specifically ex-
clude from bargaining workers whose interests were more aligned
with the interests of management as opposed to the interests of the
rank-and-file.24  This exclusionary standard was further expanded
in 1956 when in the case of Swift and Company, the NLRB not only
excluded managerial employees from a union composed of rank-
and-file workers, but refused to acknowledge these same manage-
rial employees as having any access to Section 7 rights.25
II. EVOLVING STANDARDS: THE “COMMUNITY” OR
“CONFLICT OF INTEREST” TEST
In the wake of Taft-Hartley, the Board felt it had a clear, three-
part supervisory test due to the precise wording of 2(11).  An em-
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2004).
23 See NATIONAL MARITIME UNION, IN THE BACK: ANALYSIS OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY
LAW 2 (1947). In this union booklet, the cover illustrates the spirit of the times: a
grimacing dockworker is shown with an axe buried deep in his back, thrown by a
smiling man in a business suit.
24 See Denver Dry Goods, 74 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947).
25 See Swift & Company, 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956).
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ployee must engage in at least one of the supervisory acts as de-
fined by statute; then that authority must be held in the interest of
the employer; and finally, this act must have occurred through the
use of independent judgment.26  If those three conditions were
met, the employee was a supervisor and exempt from their Section
7 rights.  Other Board practices that evolved during this time pe-
riod included the use of secondary indicia to make the determina-
tion, like perceptions of other workers, differences in pay rates,
and the amount of actual time spent supervising.27  The burden of
proving supervisory status lay with the party asserting that status—
which was almost always an employer refusing to bargain with what
they felt was an improperly formed union.
During the decades to follow, the Board gradually began to
adopt a test centered on a “community of interest.”  If an employee
was found to share interests of management over the interests of
the rank-and-file, such an employee was deemed “supervisory” and
excluded from a union of the rank-and-file in most cases.  In some
cases, like Swift, such employees might be denied Section 7 rights
altogether if the Board felt their interests were so closely allied with
management as to make them more “employers” as defined under
the NLRA.28
In 1970, the Board, after suffering a reversal from the Eighth
Circuit, made an effort to clarify its position regarding manage-
ment in the case of the North Arkansas Electric Cooperative.29  At issue
was the fate of Jack Lenox, a supervisory employee at North Arkan-
sas who was terminated for expressing a favorable opinion of the
union during a hotly-contested union election and against direct
orders from management not to express any opinion during nego-
tiations.  Initially, the NLRB had ruled for Lenox’s reinstatement,
arguing that he fell into a protected “employee” classification
under the Act.  The Eighth Circuit rejected the Board’s rationale,
and in response, the NLRB then attempted to define at what pre-
cise level an employee could be excluded from Section 7 organiza-
tion rights.  This level, according to the Board, was reached when
26 Eric J. Wiesner, Voices from the Workplace: Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. and the
Rollback of Labor Rights Under the Current National Labor Relations Board, 42 U.S.F. L. REV.
457, 468–69 (2007).
27 Michael W. Hawkins & Shawn P. Burton, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B.
No. 37 (2006): How Textualism Saved the Supervisory Exemption, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
1, 14 (2006).
28 See Bryan M. Churgin, Comment, The Managerial Exclusion Under the National La-
bor Relations Act: Are Worker Participation Programs Next? 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 557, 560
(1999).
29 See N.L.R.B. v. North Ark. Elec. Co-op., 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1969).
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the employee participated in the formulation, determination, or
effectuation of policy with respect to employee relations.30  In that
case, Lenox did not reach this level and was protected under the
Act as an employee.  The Board went even further by acknowledg-
ing that such determinations were not based on any part of the
NLRA but were solely a creation of the Board.  To make matters
even more confusing, the Board declined to set comprehensive
standards and reserved for itself the right to make such determina-
tions on a case-by-case basis.31
The new formulation was also rejected by the Eighth Circuit
who upbraided the Board for trying to read legislative intent into
an area where no clear intent could be found.32  The order to rein-
state Jack Lenox was rejected and the stage was now set for a new
conflict over who was and who was not protected under the Wag-
ner Act.33
In one case in the early 1970s, Bell Aerospace buyers had or-
ganized their own union.  Bell executives, taking their cue from
the recent Eighth Circuit decision in North Arkansas, refused to bar-
gain, citing the buyers’ status as managerial employees as exempt-
ing them from the normal Section 7 protections.  The Board not
only recognized the buyers’ union as a legitimate one and ordered
Bell to bargain with it; they also attempted to articulate a new stan-
dard regarding managerial employees.  The Board morphed the
older “community of interest” test into a “conflict of interest” test
in which the employee-manager line was crossed if the employee’s
membership in a union created a clear conflict of interest with the
employee’s role as an agent of the company.  Finding no such clear
conflict with the Bell buyers, the Board certified their union.34
The Board made it very clear in their decision that for any em-
ployee—no matter how much managerial or supervisory responsi-
bility they carried—if membership in a union did not create an
obvious and significant conflict of interest with the company, then
that employee had the protected right to organize or join a union.
Again, the Board’s ruling was rejected at the appellate level and in
30 See North Ark. Elec. Co-op., 185 N.L.R.B. 550, 550–51 (1970).
31 Id. at 550.
32 See N.L.R.B. v. North Ark. Elec. Co-op., 446 F.2d 602, 610 (8th Cir. 1971) (“[W]e
conclude that it was not the intent of Congress to provide managerial employees with
protection from being discharged for refusing to obey instructions to remain neutral
in a union election, and we deny enforcement of the Board’s order.”).
33 Id.
34 See Bell Aerospace Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 214 (1970).
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1974, the Bell case made its way to the Supreme Court.35
The Supreme Court ruled against the NLRB, with the majority
opinion coming from Justice Powell who pointed out that various
trends—the legislative history of Taft-Hartley, the various related
court decisions, and the Board’s own earlier (if inconsistent) rul-
ings—all pointed to an exclusion of managerial employees from
coverage under the Act.  Justice Powell further enforced a textual
interpretation of the Act upon the Board in that they were not free
to read a new and more restrictive meaning into the Act.36  Unfor-
tunately, Justice Powell stopped short of articulating a crystal-clear
standard for what constituted managerial activity.37  Moreover, Jus-
tice Powell refrained from drawing a clear line demarcating where
Section 7 rights ended.38  Justice White, writing in dissent, pointed
out the obvious: “The Board’s decisions in this area have not estab-
lished a cohesive and precise pattern of rulings.”39 Justice White
felt that the Act gave the Board expansive power to interpret the
meaning of the NLRA and found no good reason in the Bell case to
hamper the Board’s power or overturn their ruling.  Despite the
dissent, the ruling in Bell put an end to “community of interest”
and “conflict of interest” touchstones and the Board would now be
confined to an increasingly textual and specific interpretation of
the Act.
For the next decades, the Board seemed primarily occupied
with answering questions involving the extension of union organi-
zation to places it had never gone before—like halls of academe.40
Such diversions into the realm of the professional employee on the
35 See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
36 Id. at 274.
37 Id. at 288. Instead, Powell merely stated the obvious, that a manager or supervi-
sor was one who “formulate[d] and effectuate[d] management policies by expressing
and making operative the decisions of their employer[s].” Id. This tautology is cer-
tainly true for any employee and was of no real help in defining the precise supervi-
sory boundary where Section 7 rights were lost.
38 Id. at 290.  (“We express no opinion as to whether these buyers fall within the
category of ‘managerial employees.’”) (White, J. dissenting). We should also note that
Bell was a partial “win” for the Board in that the Court upheld the right of the NLRB
to set new standards through adjudication of cases rather than through a formal rule-
making process.  It is rather as if the Court said, “We defer to the Board’s judgment in
these matters—except in cases like this one where your judgment is wrong.”  Appar-
ently, you can have your cake and eat it too. See id. at 294.
39 Id. at 311 (White, J. dissenting).
40 See N.L,R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (determining whether or
not faculty at a private university have a right to organize). The Court ruled that when
faculty teach, they are professional employees and are covered under the Act, but
when faculty meet to make any sort of recommendation, they transform into manag-
ers and are thus excluded from protection. Id. In that faculty members are naturally
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part of the Board also coincided with the high-water mark of union
activity in the United States.  The 1970s and 1980s would see organ-
ized labor enter a period of long, slow but steady decline; until by
the turn of the new century, fewer than eight percent of the
workforce would belong to a union, down from a high of almost
thirty-five percent reached in the 1960s.  Labor and management
would wait until the early 1990s for the next major development in
the definition of “supervisor,” which would come from the health
care industry.
A. A New Standard or False Dichotomy? Nurses as Supervisors
In the health care industry, registered nurses had long been
considered “professional employees” under the NLRA and thus,
protected in their right to organize.41  The problem area comes
when professional duties and supervisory duties overlap—when
does a nurse lose her Section 7 rights as a professional employee?
How much supervision is routine and how much involves the exer-
cise of independent judgment as required under 2(11)?  When do
these employees act in the interest of the employer and when do
they act solely in the interest of their patients?  To further compli-
cate the matter—how should licensed practical nurses be treated?
The Board got a chance to answer this question and articulate
a new standard in a case involving a union being organized at a
nursing home in Ohio, owned by the Health Care and Retirement
Corporation of America.  The corporation refused to negotiate
with the newly formed union, citing that four of the union mem-
bers were licensed practical nurses who performed supervisory
functions and thus were not protected by the Act and should have
been excluded from the union.42  The Board ruled against the
company, finding that the nurses were employees—not supervi-
sors—and were indeed protected under the NLRA.43
loathe to forego regular expression of their opinion, union impact on private college
campuses has been relatively minor. Id.
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (2004) (A “professional employee” is defined as one
whose work is “predominantly intellectual and varied in character”; “involv[es] the
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance”; produces a result
which cannot be “standardized in relation to a given period of time”; and “require[es]
knowledge in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction . . . .”).
42 See R. Jason Straight, Note, Who’s the Boss?: Charge Nurses and “Independent Judg-
ment” After National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation of
America, 83 MINN. L. Rev. 1927, 1935 (1999); see also Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am.,
306 N.L.R.B. 63 (1992).
43 See N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672.
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The Board, seemingly never hesitant to articulate a new stan-
dard, zeroed in on the “interest of the employer” requirement for
supervision under 2(11).  If the nurses used their training to direct
the nurse’s aides and other lower-echelon employees to act in the
best interests of the patients, then the nurses were employees.  If
that training was used to direct the aides in ways that were solely in
the best interests of management, then the nurses were supervi-
sors.44  In that these licensed practical nurses consistently directed
other employees on behalf of their patients, the Board recognized
them as employees and recognized their right to organize.
Health Care & Retirement Corporation of America appealed
the case, and the Board’s ruling was overturned by the appellate
court.45  Then in 1994, the case was brought before the Supreme
Court.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, summed up the
Court’s prevailing opinion of the Board test for employer interest
quite succinctly: “[This] dichotomy makes no sense.”46  At the
heart of Kennedy’s opinion is the rejection of the Board’s method
of deciding Health Care: rather than analyzing the facts, the Board
chose to formulate a standard—a standard which the Court re-
jected as having no basis in legislation or legislative intent.47  Yet,
while the Court may have indeed proven their point regarding the
logical flaws in the Board’s standard on employer interest, the
Court left unanswered the larger issue of precisely defining that
long-elusive boundary between the duties of an employee and the
duties of a supervisor in situations where these duties overlapped
in the same employee. Justice Kennedy felt that the Court’s deci-
sion had no impact beyond the healthcare industry.48  On the
other hand, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, felt that the Court’s
actions could lead to a situation in which few professionals in any
industry could ever hope to receive their Section 7 rights.49
In 1947, following the heady days of Packard, it seemed as if
every employee had the right to organize.  In the aftermath of the
1994 decision, at least as far as Justice Ginsburg was concerned, it
now seemed as if very few employees still had their Section 7 rights.
A few more years would elapse before the Board tried to define the
employee–supervisor boundary.  Again, it would involve a situation
44 Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. at 70.
45 See Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am. v. NLRB., 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1993).
46 See N.L.R.B. v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 577 (1994).
47 Id. at 582.
48 Justice Kennedy writes: “Any parade of horribles about the meaning of this deci-
sion for employees in other industries is quite misplaced.” Id. at 584.
49 Id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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in the health care industry, but here the Board would look to the
“independent judgment” requirement to craft a new test.
B. Independent Judgment: Kentucky River
The case that would become known as “Kentucky River” began
at a nursing home for the mentally handicapped in Pippa Passes,
Kentucky known as the Caney Creek Developmental Complex.  Ca-
ney Creek employed about one hundred workers, of which twelve
were managers of one form or another.50  In 1997, the employees
at Caney Creek unionized with six registered nurses being included
in the union.51  The owners of Caney Creek refused to negotiate
with the union, citing that the registered nurses were supervisors
under the Act and thus did not have Section 7 rights.  This refusal
to bargain triggered an unfair labor practice complaint, which
made its way to the NLRB.52
The Board spent much time reviewing the registered nurses’
assigned duties as “building supervisors.”  Such a role means that
the registered nurses are frequently the highest-ranking employee
in the building, and this role further demands that these nurses
shift personnel from one unit to another, as demand dictates.  It
should further be noted that the registered nurses received no ad-
ditional pay for these “building supervisor” duties.53  The Board
was emphatic in their opinion that such building supervisor duties
on the part of the registered nurses did not meet the statutory defi-
nition of “supervisor” under 2(11).  A new standard was also articu-
lated by which a registered nurse directing other employees to do
something involving patient care and which fell within the nurse’s
own scope of training was routine and not indicative of supervi-
sion.54  If a nurse then directed another employee to undertake a
task not directly related to patient care and not within the scope of
her training, then such direction was indicative of independent
judgment on the part of the nurse and thus met the supervisory
criteria under 2(11).  The exact phrasing used by the Board went
as follows: “[T]he employees do not use independent judgment
when they exercise ordinary professional or technical judgment in
directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance
50 See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
51 They sought to be represented by the Kentucky State District Council of
Carpenters. Id. at 707.
52 Id.
53 See Ky. River Cmty. Care v. N.L.R.B., 193 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 1999).
54 Id. at 453.
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with employer-specified standards.”55
The Board’s Acting Regional Director rejected this decision,
finding in favor of including nurses in the bargaining unit, and the
case found its way into the Sixth Circuit in 1999.56  The attorneys
for Kentucky River claimed that as a non-profit entity, the nursing
home was a quasi-governmental agency and therefore immune
from the Act.  Alternatively, they argued that if the Act did indeed
apply, the nurses were supervisors not employees.  The Sixth Cir-
cuit quickly rejected the first argument but readily embraced the
latter.  The Sixth Circuit already had a precedent in which it found
that nurses do become supervisors when they engage in any one of
three acts: directing other employees to give patient care or to rec-
tify staffing shortages, filling out any sort of evaluation on the em-
ployees they were directing, or finally, acting as a building
supervisor.57  That the Board had not accounted for any of the
Sixth Circuit’s prior decisions in articulating its new “independent
judgment” standard did not sit well with the court, and the Sixth
Circuit summarily rejected the Board’s new standard, stating: “This
[supervisory] definition is a substantially binding rule of law in this
court that is no longer open to question.”58  They went even fur-
ther by rejecting the Board’s long-standing practice of placing the
burden of proving supervisory status upon the party disputing such
status, finding that in any issue of a supervisory-status dispute, the
burden of proving that status lay with the Board.59  The case was
granted certiorari and was argued before the Supreme Court in
early 2001.60
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court.  He was quick to point out that Kentucky River was first and
foremost about the way in which the Board had interpreted the Act
beyond the Act’s original textual boundaries.61  The two issues in
play—the burden of proof issue and the interpretation of “inde-
pendent judgment” in relation to supervision—were not fully and
comprehensively addressed by the Act and thus subject to varying
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Mid-Am. Health Care Found. v. N.L.R.B., 148 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 1998).
58 See Ky. River Cmty. Care 193 F.3d at 456–57 (Jones, J., dissenting).  Judge Jones
pointed out that he felt the “substantial evidence” standard held in judicial review of
Board decisions controls, and the Board had more than met that standard by proving
that the registered nurses received no extra compensation for their building supervi-
sor duties nor were able to hire or fire employees.
59 Id. at 453.
60 See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713–15 (2001).
61 Id.
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degrees of interpretation.  Justice Scalia felt that the Board’s inter-
pretation of “independent judgment” lacked any consistency with
either the stated text of the Act or the Board’s previous decisions
on the matter.  He further wrote that the Board had overstepped
its authority regarding the nature of “independent judgment” in
that it was the Board’s role to decide matters of degree, not invent
categorical exclusions unsupported by the Act.62  In short, the
Board had once again failed to find a standard to measure supervi-
sion that would meet the approval of the Supreme Court.  On a
brighter note, Justice Scalia took the Board’s side on the burden of
proof issue finding that although no clear textual imperative for
the practice was contained within the Act, the Board’s behavior
here was consistent with decades of prior Board decisions and thus
congruent with the Act.63
It is perhaps more interesting to look at what was not resolved
by Kentucky River.  Following the decision, there was still no clear
definition of “supervisor” that was readily understood and accepted
by both labor and management.  More importantly, we still had no
definition of “supervisor” that was supported by the courts.  The
Board did not know exactly how to resolve the situation or whether
it even possessed the necessary interpretive power to resolve any
situations not expressly laid out in the text of the Act.
In an unprecedented action, the Board requested amicus
briefs from the stakeholders in this area of labor law in July of 2003
with input being requested on a range of targeted issues.  Some of
those issues included were raised specifically by Kentucky River in-
cluding: the differences between “assigning” and “directing,” the
meaning of the word “responsibly,” and the meaning of the term
“independent judgment.”64  These opinions were gathered by the
Board and studied, and by 2006, there was finally an action that
provides the current culmination of the long legislative and judi-
cial history of the supervisory exemption.
III. THE YEAR 2006: THE KENTUCKY RIVER TRILOGY
By 2006, the Board had several cases from previous years that
62 Id.  at 713. The Board’s policy regarding the proper balance of labor-manage-
ment power cannot be given effect through the statutory text. Because this Court may
not enforce the Board’s order by applying a legal standard the Board did not adopt,
the Board’s error precludes the Court from enforcing its order. Id. at 707.
63 Id.; see JEFFREY M. SMITH, The Prospect for Continued Protection for Professionals under
the NLRA: Reaction to the Kentucky River Decision and the Expanding Notion of the Supervi-
sor, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 581–583 (2003).
64 Weisner, supra note 26, at 475–79.
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involved some interpretation of the supervisory exemption.  Armed
with the data and opinions from the amicus briefs and the Kentucky
River Supreme Court decision, the Board issued three landmark
decisions on September 29, 2006 intended to articulate a new vi-
sion of the supervisory exemption that was true to the legislative
intent of Taft-Hartley and that squared with the Supreme Court’s
decision on Kentucky River.  These three decisions—Croft Metals,
Golden Crest Healthcare and Oakwood Healthcare—became known as
the “Kentucky River Trilogy” and provided what former Board
Chairman William Gould called a “seismic shift” in statutory inter-
pretation.65  While all three decisions were released simultane-
ously, the true sequence is to begin with Oakwood and then follow
with Croft and Golden Crest as the former articulates a standard that
is referred to in the latter two decisions.
Oakwood Heritage Hospital employs almost 200 registered
nurses spread out over ten patient units at the hospital.  While the
registered nurses report to various levels of stipulated supervisors,
they also direct other hospital employees in the performance of
routine patient care tasks like feeding, cleaning, bathing, and walk-
ing.66  This scenario is similar to the facts of Kentucky River in that
these nurses spend part of their time acting as employees, follow-
ing direction from doctors and titled supervisors, and spend the
rest of their time in directing less-skilled employees in which they
take on a more supervisory role.  Once again, just like Kentucky
River, the question remained: At what point do these registered
nurses cease to be employees and become supervisors under
2(11)?
To further complicate matters, in Oakwood we are introduced
to the concept of “charge nurses.”  These nurses oversee the vari-
ous patient care units and assign other employees, including regis-
tered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nursing assistants and
technicians to minister specific patients within the hospital.  The
charge nurses do not assign employees to shifts.  Once the em-
ployee reports for duty, they go to the charge nurse to find out
which patients within a unit with whom they will be dealing.  In
sum, the charge nurse determines the “who” and “how” while the
staffing office sets the “when” and “where.”  These charge nurses
receive an extra level of compensation for these increased duties,
65 See Steven Greenhouse, Board Redefines Rules for Union Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2006, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/04/washington/
04labor.html.
66 See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 687 (2006).
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and while approximately ten percent of the Oakwood registered
nurses were designated as permanent charge nurses, the majority of
the remaining registered nurses take turns rotating as temporary
charge nurses.67  The dilemma confronting the Board was whether
the permanent charge nurses were employees or supervisors.
The conflict occurred along traditional lines: the union
sought to include all charge nurses (permanent and rotating)
within the registered nurses unit while the corporate owners of
Oakwood Hospital sought to exclude all charge nurses on the basis
of their supervisory duties.68  The Regional Director for the NLRB
found in favor of the union, included the registered nurses in the
election, which was then contested by the corporation.  The Board
decision sought to define the nature of supervision at a level of
clarity unprecedented in previous Board decisions going back over
five decades.  The result was a three-prong test involving defini-
tions for “assign,” “independent judgment,” and “responsibly to
direct”.
In the majority Board decision, a connection was made be-
tween the ordinary meaning of the word “assign” and the list of
functions in 2(11) that share a commonality involving a term or
condition of employment.69  Specifically, the Board found that the
act of “assigning” occurred when a charge nurse assigned an em-
ployee to a specific location or place, a specific time or shift, or
specific tasks or duties.70  In short, “assigning” occurs when one
employee tells another to go to a certain place, at a certain time to
perform a certain task.  Here, the Board majority felt the charge
nurses were indeed engaging in assignment as defined under
2(11).71
For such direction to be “responsible,” the Board found that
the responsible employee must bear some burden or carry some
risk of adverse consequences if the directed employee fails to per-
form properly.  This requires a further two-part test: the supervisor
must have authority to both assign and take corrective action if re-
quired as well as carry a chance of adverse consequences for the
supervisor if the employee does not perform as directed.72  Here,
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 689. The majority consisted of Board members Battista, Schaumber and
Kirsanow.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 694. Specifically, it was the assignment of other nurses to specific locations
by the charge nurses that met the assignment test.
72 Id. at 692.
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the majority decision found that the hospital failed to prove that
the charge nurses bore any true accountability for the actions of
the employees they were directing and thus did not meet the “re-
sponsible direction” standard.73
Finally, the Board dealt with the notion of “independent judg-
ment,” which the majority defined as the ability to act indepen-
dently based on decisions made by comparing available data, free
from outside control.74  While most of the permanent charge
nurses were found to meet this qualification, the charge nurses in
the emergency room were found not meeting the “independent
judgment” criterion.  The difference in the emergency room was
that the charge nurses do not take into account outside factors in
making their decisions but are operating solely on the basis of pre-
set policy.  This difference was defined by the Board as the “discre-
tionary” component of independent judgment.75
The Oakwood decision concludes with a look at the rotating
charge nurses. The majority opinion pointed out that past prece-
dent meant that a rotating supervisor would be considered a super-
visor if a “regular and substantial” portion of their work-time was
spent in supervisory activities.76  In that the rotation of charge
nurses at Oakwood was accomplished without the use of a regular
schedule but in an irregular and ad hoc manner, the Board quickly
excluded the rotating charge nurses from the supervisory
exemption.77
As the dust settled, the Board’s majority had articulated three
new standards for supervision: assignment (place, time, duty), re-
sponsibility (must be accountable for the actions of those being as-
signed), and independence of judgment (must have the discretion to
make judgments free of outside influences).  The majority of the
Board had also confirmed their preference for case-by-case deci-
sions that hung on interpretation of the statutes rather than a re-
73 The evidence showed that the charge nurses are accountable for their own per-
formance or lack thereof, not the performance of others and consequently, was insuf-
ficient to establish responsible direction. Id. at 695.
74 Id. at 698. Where the charge nurse makes an assignment based on the skill,
experience, and temperament of other nursing personnel, that charge nurse has ex-
ercised the requisite discretion to make the assignment a supervisory function.
75 Id. at 693.
76 See Brown & Root, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 19, 20–21 (1994), (defining “regular” as
“according to a pattern or schedule,” while “substantial” could mean as little as ten to
fifteen percent of the total work-time); Archer Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 674, 676
(1956), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Board%20Decisions/115/
VOL115-098.pdf.  This “ten percent rule” would prove to be quite inflammatory.
77 See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 689.
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sults-oriented approach that would stretch and distort the Act.78  As
for the Oakwood Hospital registered nurses, the Board found that
most of the permanent charge nurses were supervisors under the
Act and thus excluded from union membership, while none of the
rotating charge nurses met the supervisory criteria and thus could
be included in the union.79
The Board then used these standards to articulate decisions in
the other two cases in the Trilogy: Golden Crest and Croft Metals.
Golden Crest revisits familiar territory in that it deals with registered
nurses organizing a union at a nursing home facility in Minne-
sota.80  Here, again, the employer was refusing to bargain with the
constituted union based on its contention that the registered
nurses in the union were actually supervisors as defined by the
Act.81  The primary contention of the company was that the nurses
met the supervisory criteria of 2(11) through their ability to assign.
Registered nurses assigned nursing assistants to specific floors of
the facility, sent nursing assistants home if the facility was perceived
to be overstaffed, and called assistants in to work from home if con-
ditions warranted.82  The Board, in their decision, felt that the as-
signment prerogatives of the “assignment” or “direction” test as
articulated in Oakwood were met.83  The next prong of the three-
part test was responsible direction or accountability of the nurses
for their direction of their assistants.  Despite evidence that such
ability to direct was an integral part of the nurse’s yearly evaluation
process, the Board found that the employer had not met the bur-
den of required proof in that the accountability was prospective
rather than actual when it came to direction of subordinates.84  Al-
though the nurses received ratings on their perceived ability to di-
rect subordinates, these performance ratings had no real “teeth”
and did not result in pay raises for those who directed well or ter-
mination for those nurses who directed poorly.  The ratings were
not proof of accountability as required under the newly-minted
78 Id. at 699.  (“If our adherence to the text of and intent behind the Act should
lead to consequences that some would deem undesirable, the effective remedy lies
with the Congress.”).
79 Id. at 699.
80 Golden Crest Healthcare Center, 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 727 (2006).
81 Id. The union was formed as a unit of the United Steelworkers of America in
early 1999. Just like Oakwood, the Board’s Regional Director issued a ruling that the
nurses were employees and not supervisors.
82 Id. at 729.
83 Id. at 732.
84 Id. at 731 (“Thus, we find that the ‘prospect of adverse consequences’ for the
charge nurses here is merely speculative and insufficient to establish accountability.”).
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Oakwood standard.85  Without meeting the “responsibility” test, the
employer’s claim for supervisory status on the nurses fails.
Croft Metals, the final part of the Trilogy, represents a failure by
the employer to prove supervisor status on the part of “lead” em-
ployees at an aluminum and vinyl door and window factory in Mis-
sissippi.86  The lead employees at the factory were responsible for
telling other employees how to perform their tasks, in what loca-
tions to perform their tasks, and the specific order in which to per-
form their tasks.  Thus, the lead employees comfortably met the
“responsibly direct” piece of the test as defined by Oakwood.87
However, the evidence showed that the lead employees made their
decisions based on prior routines or standard patterns and that any
evidence of independence or discretion on the part of the supervi-
sors was lacking.88  Again, like Golden Crest, with the company fail-
ing to meet all three prongs of the Oakwood test, the Board’s
conclusion was that the lead employees at Croft were employees,
not supervisors under 2(11).89
The reaction to the Trilogy was based more on the implica-
tions of the decisions rather than on their immediate impact on
the parties involved.  The Trilogy gave a new three-part test for su-
pervision but only in its particulars.  However, while the permanent
charge nurses at Oakwood were indeed supervisors, the charge
nurses at Golden Crest and the lead employees at Croft were not
supervisors.  The immediate reaction from organized labor was
overwhelmingly negative; the main points of contention being that
the Oakwood test would leave millions of Americans unable to join
unions.90  The AFL-CIO President, John Sweeney, referred to the
decision as “outrageous and unjustified,” noting with dismay that
under the ruling employees could be considered supervisors with
as little as ten percent of their time spent supervising, and planned
protests outside the Board’s headquarters.91  Other commentators
called into question the way the decision split along political
lines—with the three Republican members of the Board in the ma-
85 Id.
86 See Croft Metals, 348 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2006).
87 Id. at 722.
88 Id. “The Employer’s own witnesses, to the extent that they testified about the
lead persons’ judgment involved in directing the crews, described such directions as
‘routine.’”
89 Id. at 717.
90 See posting of James Parks, AFL–CIO Now Blog, http://blog.aflcio.org/2006/
10/03/labor-board-ruling-may-bar-millions-of-workers-from-forming-unions/ (Nov.
11, 2008, 6:29 EST).
91 Id.
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jority and the two Democratic members of the Board in dissent.92
The dissent in Oakwood was particularly stinging with Board mem-
bers Liebman and Walsh citing the risk that the majority decision
would, by the year 2012, deprive as many as thirty-four million em-
ployees of their Section 7 rights under the Act.93
In 1935, when the Act itself was written, the notion of what
constituted “management” and what constituted “employee”
seemed so self-evident that the drafters of the Act did not bother
inserting precise definitions.  The Packard case demonstrated the
need for a definition of “supervisor” which was then promptly sup-
plied by Taft-Hartley and the creation of the 2(11) supervisory ex-
emption. In the sixty years that span the creation of 2(11) and the
Kentucky River Trilogy, there is no consistent application or inter-
pretation of what it means to be a “supervisor.”  More importantly,
while the Board has wrestled with this question over the last six
decades, dramatic economic changes have occurred in the United
States, especially in the nature of employment.
IV. THE CHANGING NATURE OF SUPERVISION
Working for a wage is a comparatively recent phenomenon.
This way of keeping body and soul together was so novel that Adam
Smith found it a worthy way of introducing his book, The Wealth of
Nations, to the public in 1776.94  Prior to the creation of large con-
cerns employing hundreds of individuals, the working class in the
Western world earned their daily bread by making and selling
small crafts or by farming.95  By the early nineteenth century, as the
industrial revolution spread across the United States from its gene-
sis in the eastern seaboard cities, wage work was often seen as little
better than slavery.96  These tensions, caused primarily by the tran-
92 See Steven Greenhouse, Board Redefines Rules for Union Exemption, N.Y TIMES, Oct.
4, 2006, at 16.
93 See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 700 (“Most professionals have some
supervisory responsibilities in the sense of directing another’s work—the lawyer his
secretary, the teacher his teacher’s aide, the doctor his nurses, the registered nurse
her nurse’s aide, and so on.”).
94 Adam Smith begins his great work by discussing the heretofore-unimaginable
productivity of wage-earning laborers at a pin factory who practiced division of labor.
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3–4 (Barnes & Noble Books 2004) (1776).
95 Multiunit businesses administered by a professional managerial class and con-
taining a distinct class of wage-earning employees did not exist in America in the 18th
and 19th Centuries. See ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 3–6 (1977) (“Such en-
terprises did not exist in the United States in 1840.”).  The primary economic revolu-
tion of the late nineteenth century transmitted the U.S. economy from an agricultural
one to an industrial economy.
96 See ROBERT REICH, THE FUTURE OF SUCCESS 90 (VINTAGE BOOKS 2002) (2000)
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sition of the U.S. economy from agriculture to industry, erupted in
the large levels of labor unrest seen in the decades following the
Civil War.97
The level of unrest did not stop the rapid transformation of
America’s workforce from a position of relative self-sufficiency to
one of wage dependence.  Between 1870 and 1910, the U.S. popu-
lation doubled while the number of wageworkers quadrupled.98
These tensions acted upon the American body politic, forcing
policymakers to come to terms with this new demographic and
their demands.  Child labor prohibitions were passed, minimum
wage laws and overtime rules were established, and the culmina-
tion of this process of accommodation between wageworkers and
management was reached in 1935 with the passage of the Act,
which established the right to organize for labor and imposed the
obligation to bargain in good faith.
Human social evolution is not a process with a beginning or
an end.  The continuing transformation of the U.S. workforce did
not cease with the adoption of the Act in 1935.  To see how dramat-
ically conditions have shifted, it will be instructive to look at what
former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich refers to as the “Three
Rules of Employment” that were established in the decades follow-
ing the adoption of the Act.99  These rules are: work is steady with
predictable pay raises (the “job-for-life” or “salary man” mentality);
next, effort is limited (you work eight hours a day, five days a
week); and finally, a steady job of any kind is a ticket to the middle
class.100  These rules form the backbone of the U.S. “Golden Age”
of the 1950s and 1960s.
The next step is to look at these “Rules” as we enter the first
decade of the twenty-first century.  Work now seems anything but
steady—the employee who will begin and end a career with the
same company is so rare as to be practically non-existent.101  In-
(explaining that wages are a cunning device of the devil for the benefit of tender
consciences who would retain all the advantages of the slave system without the ex-
pense, odium, and trouble of being slave holders).
97 Id. at 90–91 (citing the Pullman Strikes of 1894 as an illustrative example: fed-
eral troops were deployed and martial law was declared in Chicago as the leaders of
the strike were beaten and jailed).
98 Id. at 91.
99 Id. 93–97 (arguing in part that there is a time delay between problem and action
in political endeavors and that because we are still in the mind-set of our youth, we
often do not react properly to current conditions).
100 Id. at 91. It is also instructive to note the compression of wages between those at
the top of the corporation and those at the bottom. Such income disparities were at
low levels in the decades following World War II.
101 Id. at 98.
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comes have also become unreliable as paychecks are increasingly
tied to variable money sources like sales results or grant funding—
and this does not include the startling statistic that as of 1999, one-
third of the workforce was employed in some sort of temporary
capacity.102  The days of the company man appear to be over, and
the freelancer is now at center stage in the workplace.
As far as “limited effort” goes—this no longer seems to exist.
Boundaries between home and work are vanishing.  The last few
decades have also seen the introduction and absorption of the ma-
jority of American women into the workforce.103  This has caused a
vicious circle of sorts: Americans are working longer, have more
unpredictable hours, and thus need to run their vital household
errands at all hours of the day and night.  This creates a “24-7”
economy that requires “24-7” workers, which further increases the
length and relative unpredictability of the workweek.104
Now for the middle class: “under siege” might be the best way
to describe the trends of the last few decades.  For Americans with
only a high school education, absolute earnings reached a high-
water mark in 1979 and have been on the decline ever since.105
For many years, only those without a college degree seemed to feel
this pinch, but since 2000, the relative incomes of all Americans—
except for those in the top one percent of earnings—have lost
ground in absolute terms.106  To summarize, in the early twenty-
first century, wage work is transient, time-consuming and in terms
of absolute income, rather terrible.  The “rules” of work that
reigned supreme in the 1950s and 1960s have not just been broken
but trampled, thrown out, and forgotten.  Yet, this vastly different
workplace is still governed by the regulations of the Act—an Act
designed and built for a different time.
One aspect of wage work during the golden years of the
“rules” was its algorithmic nature.  An algorithm merely means a
step-by-step process that is used to accomplish a task or solve a
problem.  “Wash, rinse, repeat” is an algorithm for hair washing,
102 Temporary status includes part-timers, freelancers, and independent contrac-
tors. Id.
103 Id. at 100–01.
104 While the average workweeks of European employees has been on the decline
since the 1980’s, the typical American workweek has continued to increase over the
same time period with Americans working more than 300 hours a year.
105 See Martin Hutchinson, America’s Disappearing Middle Class, ASIA TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007 at A1, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/IK15Dj01.
html.
106 The American dream, in which hard work can propel ordinary people into a
comfortable, even affluent, lifestyle is becoming ever more distant. Id.
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and “heat at 350 degrees for thirty minutes” is an algorithm for
cooking a frozen pizza. In the workplace, algorithms lend them-
selves to automation.  The complex, but sequential process that
turns a hunk of steel into a wrench can easily be programmed into
a computer or industrial robot, and the same productivity gains
that Adam Smith saw with the human division of labor can be fur-
ther increased by removing the human factor entirely and replac-
ing it with a machine.107  Scholars predict that any algorithmic or
routine work that can be automated will be automated, and any
algorithmic work that cannot be automated will soon be out-
sourced overseas.108
The value of industries based around algorithmic work has
also declined.  The steel industry provides an illustrative example
in that it is a quintessential algorithmic industry.  The jobs on the
floor of a mill are defined by slavish adherence to protocol and
procedure.  Deviation from the rules can cost a worker their limbs
or even their lives.  Yet, as of 2000, the market value of the entire
steel industry in the United States was less than half the stock mar-
ket value of the internet store, Amazon.com.109  In that there is a
connection between union membership and algorithmic work,
simply one has to consider union membership as a percent of the
workforce.  The decline of jobs featuring such routine work has
been in decline, and so has union membership: it peaked at thirty
percent in the late 1960s and has been on a steady decline ever
since, with less than ten percent of the workforce enjoying union
protections by the year 2000.110
To find out where the economy is headed and what the future
holds for the nature of work in America, it is instructive to look at
various secondary school curriculum initiatives that are designed to
help the next generation of high school graduates find jobs in the
ever-changing twenty-first century economy.  One of the largest is
“Route 21,” created by the Partnership for 21st Century Skills.111
Here, businesses (including Apple, Adobe, Cisco and Intel) have
teamed with various national educational organizations to create
107 See Arnold H. Packer & Gloria K Sharrar, Linking Lifelong Learning, Corporate
Social Responsibility and the Changing Nature of Work, 5 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING HUM.
RESOURCES, 332, 333 (2003).
108 See generally Brandon Fish, William Allen Rees, Robert Trumble & S. Daniel
West, International Outsourcing of Knowledge Based Jobs, 14 WTR INT’L HR J. 2 (2005).
109 See REICH, supra note 96, at 77.
110 Id. at 78.
111 Welcome to Route 21, http://www.21stcenturyskills.org/route21/ (last visited
Jan. 1, 2009).
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curriculum goals for the nation’s secondary schools that will allow
American high school graduates to become productive employees
in the new economy.112  The career skills that are being stressed all
revolve around flexibility in the workplace. The goals are broken
down into five sub-categories, beginning with “adaptability,” which
is taken to mean “working effectively in a climate of ambiguity and
changing priorities.”113  Next is “self-direction,” which is defined as
“defining, prioritizing and completing tasks without direct over-
sight,” followed by “social skills,” taken to mean, “working appro-
priately and productively with others.”114  “Reliability” comes next,
and the recommendations conclude with “leadership,” which is de-
fined as “using interpersonal skills to influence and guide others
towards a goal.”115
When these five curriculum goals are compared to the three-
part supervision test as defined in the Trilogy, “independent judg-
ment” would seem to be satisfied by the “self-direction” goal while
“leadership” seems to cover “assignment.”  Only “responsibility” is
left unmet by the curriculum, but this is in the hands of the em-
ployer in that all they have to do is create conditions where nega-
tive consequences exist if the assignment actions of the employees
fail to meet employer-defined standards.  To rephrase: the United
States is entering a stage of the economy and an evolution of the
workforce where, if “Route 21” and others like it are successful in
their efforts to re-engineer the next generation of employees, the
boundary between “supervisor” and “worker” will be blurred be-
yond recognition.
The conclusion is inescapable: society is entering an era where
algorithmic work will be a small piece of the U.S. economy where
practically every American employee will be a self-directed one,
who may lead a work-group one week and be a member of another
work-group the next week.
It took six decades for the Board to find a functional interpre-
tation for 2(11) but all that effort seems increasingly meaningless
in a workplace where everyone will share some measure of supervi-
sory duties as defined by the Trilogy.  In such a workplace where
112 Welcome to Route 21, About Route 21, http://www.21stcenturyskills.org/
route21/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=44 (last vis-
ited on Jan. 1, 2009).
113 Welcome to Route 21, Life and Career Skills, http://www.21stcenturyskills.org/
route21/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Itemid=11 (last vis-
ited on Jan. 1, 2009).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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everyone is a supervisor, will anyone have Section 7 rights under
the Act?  In a fascinating, ironic turn of events, we have come full
circle from the days of Packard where even vice presidents had the
right to organize.  Now it seems in a self-directed twenty-first cen-
tury workplace, no one may have a clear, undeniable right to join a
union, free of challenge by an employer.
V. THE RESPECT ACT—A POSSIBLE REMEDY?116
In the spring of 2007, in the 110th Congress, a bill was intro-
duced and then referred to the Committee on Education and La-
bor entitled the “Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional
Employees and Construction Trades workers Act” (“the RESPECT
Act”).117 The bill, sponsored by Senator Dodd and Representative
Robert Andrews, seeks to literally tear the heart out of the Ken-
tucky River Trilogy by amending the language of 2(11).  This pro-
posed bill would strike the word “assign” from 2(11), eliminate the
phrase “or responsibly to direct them,” and insert a phrase stating
that the remaining supervisory duties must occupy a majority of an
individuals work time for that individual to be considered a
supervisor.118
The bill would solve the sixty years of judicial agonizing over
2(11) in one fell, legislative swoop.  The contentious terms, “as-
sign” and “responsibly to direct” would be eliminated by the RE-
SPECT Act.  The bill also eliminates the “ten percent standard” for
supervision articulated in Oakwood. The bill would leave 2(11) to
read as follows:
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer and for a majority of the individ-
ual’s work time, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, reward, or discipline other employees, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such author-
ity is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of independent judgment.119
Hiring, firing, transferring, suspending, recalling, laying off,
promoting, rewarding, or disciplining are all prerogatives long as-
sociated with management in general or supervision in particular.
Supervision carries three basic attributes: first, that the individual is
116 The RESPECT Act was not passed in the 110th Congress.
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involved in rating performance or in setting compensation; sec-
ondly, that the individual has the capacity or is directly involved in
hiring and firing decisions; and finally, that the individual is also
involved in making schedules.120
The RESPECT Act would solve all the clarity problems associ-
ated with assigning or responsibly directing that have occupied the
Board for the better part of six decades.  The RESPECT Act would
also shift the focus to more traditional supervisory prerogatives like
hiring, firing or, disciplining and away from the fuzzy areas of Ken-
tucky River like assigning or responsibly directing.  In a coming fu-
ture bereft of algorithmic work, the RESPECT Act would allow the
“self-directed” and “flexible” employees of the future the right to
organize under the Act.
CONCLUSION
As originally written, the Wagner Act made no provisions for
the exclusion of supervisors from the right to organize unions.
This situation reached a climax during the Packard case of 1947
and was remedied by the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act that
same year.  The Taft-Hartley Act created a supervisory exemption,
which, over time, became the nexus of many a crisis for the NLRB.
The Board tried over the years to find an interpretation of the su-
pervisory exemption that would meet with Supreme Court ap-
proval.  Finally, after the Court’s rejection of Kentucky River in 2001,
the Board requested amicus briefs and released a landmark ruling in
the fall of 2006, known as the Kentucky River Trilogy.
The Trilogy established a three-part test for supervisory status,
involving direction (place, time, duties), responsibility (the em-
ployee must face real and serious consequences for the failures of
subordinates), and independent judgment.  The Trilogy was also
notable for the articulation of a time-based standard and a very low
one at that, in that as little as ten percent of an employee’s time
could be spent in supervision for that employee to be considered a
supervisor.  Response to the Trilogy from organized labor was neg-
ative, with cited fears that the Trilogy would deprive as many as
one-third of America’s workforce from Section 7 rights.
120 See Testimony on RESPECT Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1644 Before the Subcomm. on
Health, Employment and Labor of the H. Comm. On Education and Labor, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of William Tambussi, Labor Counsel, Cooper University Hospital),
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/050807BillTambussitestimony.pdf (Tambussi
felt that the RESPECT Act would provide “clarity to the current situation in light of
recent conflicting decisions by the NLRB.”).
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These fears are further exacerbated by a cursory analysis of
changes in the workplace. Routine manufacturing work, the staple
of union membership in the middle of the twentieth century, is fast
disappearing.  Such algorithmic work is increasingly being auto-
mated or outsourced.  The “rules of employment” articulated by
former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (steady jobs, limited effort,
and ease-of-entry into the middle class) that held sway during the
peak union membership years of the 1950’s and 1960’s have now
all been broken.  Today’s workforce will work for multiple employ-
ers over the span of their lifetime, put in longer hours, and have no
guarantee of a middle-class income.  The future of the workplace
can be seen in the various efforts to train twenty-first century
workforce skills to secondary school students.  These skills all re-
volve around self-directed employees leading various small work
groups who move from one task to the next, forming and re-form-
ing with no clear boundary between employer and supervisor as
defined by the Trilogy.
The nature of the workforce and supervision in particular has
evolved at a pace much faster than the judicial interpretations of
the Wagner Act.  The Trilogy shows that even after six decades
under the heat of Board rulings and court decisions, the definition
of supervisor has not kept pace with the events and trends of the
outside world.
Given the changing nature of supervision in the twenty-first
century workforce, the Trilogy ruling leaves us in the exact oppo-
site position of Packard sixty years ago.  If the intent of the Wagner
Act is to be fully carried out, the Trilogy decision is unworkable in
the light of current workplace trends where every self-directed em-
ployee will spend some time directing others.  As judicial remedies
appear to be exhausted after six decades of effort, a legislative rem-
edy is possible under the proposed RESPECT Act.  It would steer
the supervisory definition away from assigning and directing and
back to the more familiar territory of hiring, firing, and
disciplining.

